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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last fifteen years there have been important advances in 
aspects of American immigration law that protect lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) persons and women who may 
have been victims of gender-based violence in their home 
countries.  Earlier immigration law legally excluded lesbian and gay 
men because the medical and psychiatric communities believed 
homosexuality was a disease.1  We, as a country, are to be 
commended for now extending grants of asylum to those who may 
have experienced past persecution or who fear future persecution 
in their countries of origin because of their sexual orientation or 
victimization on account of gender violence.  As this article will 
demonstrate, such types of persecution may be considered together 
and may be best described as “persecution based on sexual 
orientation.” 
One such recent case, typical of many, started in 2003, and 
involved Gramoz Prestreshi, an eighteen year-old citizen of Kosovo 
who was stalked and beaten almost to death by a group of local 
thugs because he was a homosexual.2  Prestreshi was laughed at and 
called names by the police to whom he reported his beating.3  In 
the hospital emergency room he was made to mop up his own 
blood.4  He had photographs taken of his injuries and complained 
to the press about the hostile environment homosexuals endure in 
Kosovo.5  His family later disowned him for his sexual orientation.6  
He joined a gay rights organization and in 2007 was granted asylum 
in the United States on the grounds that his treatment in Kosovo 
amounted to persecution.7
 1. See Alan G. Bennett, Note, The “Cure” that Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based 
Asylum and the Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 279, 
279 (1999) (citing Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, § 3, 39 
Stat. 874, 875 (1917)).  In 1990, Congress removed this impediment from the law 
in the Immigration Act of 1990.  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 
601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 (1990).  The statute simply eliminated “sexual 
deviants” from its list of classes of excludable aliens.  Id. 
 2. See Pamela Constable, Persecuted Gays Seek Refuge in U.S., WASH. POST, July 
10, 2007, at A6. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. On October 30, 2007, the author confirmed this story in a telephone 
interview with Todd Pilcher, an attorney with the Whitman-Walker Clinic in 
Washington, D.C. who assisted Prestreshi in obtaining asylum. 
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Although such grants of asylum are generally unknown to the 
American public, this law professor and author is one of many who, 
for the last few years, have taught and written about the 
phenomenon of grants of asylum on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and the problems involved in obtaining justice for 
victims of such persecution.8  My earlier article, “Give Me Your Gays, 
Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe 
Free of Sexual Persecution...”: The New Grounds for Grants of Asylum,9 
consisted of an analysis of some of the problems of obtaining 
justice in our asylum system for persons such as Gramoz Prestreshi 
and other victims of persecution on the basis of sexual orientation.  
The analysis of those problems revealed the need for several 
solutions.  First, it exposed the need for more consistency in 
defining and interpreting our asylum law.  Second, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)10 needs to better 
formulate policies that might guarantee uniformly just results in 
cases of those escaping persecution based on their sexual 
orientation.  Finally, the U.S. Justice Department needs to provide 
more published opinions in sexual persecution cases as well as 
better-trained and more sensitive immigration judges. 
The article was written from the point of view of an author 
who, earlier in his legal career, worked in the U.S. State 
Department and later, while in private practice, represented many 
different people in immigration court who sought asylum from 
various kinds of persecution.11  A number of colleagues, students, 
and former students have found the article informative and 
interesting.  Others did not care for the subject matter of the 
 8. In the late 1990s, two sets of helpful bibliographies on the subject were 
published.  See Ronald I. Mirvis, Political Asylum in the United States: A Selective 
Bibliography, 54 THE RECORD 688 (1999); Elisa Mason, The Protection Concerns of 
Refugee Women: A Bibliography, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1999). 
 9. Leonard Birdsong, “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of 
Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .”: The New Grounds for 
Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 357 (2008). 
 10. Created by a 2003 reorganization spurred by the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, this department inherited most of the functions formerly carried 
out by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  Those functions are 
distributed among three DHS bureaus: CBP, ICE and USCIS.  See DAVID A. 
MARTIN, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, 
FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY, at x (2007). 
 11. The author served as a State Department Foreign Service officer with 
postings in Nigeria, Germany, the Bahamas, and Washington, D.C. during the late 
1970s and 1980s.  During the 1990s, while in private law practice in Washington, 
D.C., a part of his practice involved representing clients with asylum claims. 
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article and were surprised to find that “gays and lesbians” could be 
granted asylum in the United States.  The most cogent criticism of 
the former article was directed at this author by a colleague who 
opined that I, as one who has done asylum work and now teaches 
about asylum trends, should be doing more to advance the law in 
this area.  This may be true.  What the earlier article did not do was 
to propose a solution to the problem by actually suggesting how 
our asylum law may be rewritten to provide uniform justice to those 
fleeing persecution because of their sexual orientations. 
Thus, this article is a legislative rejoinder to my original article 
regarding how and why our asylum statute may be better rewritten 
or amended to ensure uniformity and justice to those fleeing 
persecution based on sexual orientation.  Part II of this article 
provides a perspective on the foundation for asylum law.12  Part III 
briefly explains a few of the problems in adjudicating asylum claims 
based on persecution on account of sexual orientation within the 
current state of the law and regulations.13  Part IV discusses the 
guidelines and proposed regulations for adjudicating asylum claims 
for women who may have been persecuted by non-state 
persecutors.14  Part V proposes five amendments to our asylum law 
at section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that 
will better provide justice to victims of persecution based on sexual 
orientation.15  They include: 1) a comprehensive definition of 
“persecution”; 2) a rule that “punitive intent” on the part of the 
persecutor is not a requirement for a finding of “persecution”; 3) a 
definition of  “particular social group” that is in accord with the 
Ninth Circuit’s definition set out in the Hernandez-Montiel case; 4) 
recognition in accord with international standards that women may 
assert “persecution” on account of their gender as well as on the 
other current statutory grounds; and 5) a requirement that the 
Board of Immigration Appeals publish written opinions in cases 
granting asylum in sexual persecution and coercive population 
control cases.  Part VI is my model legislation.16  The article 
concludes with the recommendation that the U.S. Congress 
implement the amendments set out herein.17
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See infra Part VI. 
 17. See infra Part VII. 
4
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II. THE FOUNDATION FOR ASYLUM 
The foundation for our asylum law grew out of international 
norms for refugee protection derived from the 1951 United 
Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.18  The 1951 Convention provided protection for World 
War II refugees, many of whom had been refugees displaced 
because of Nazi atrocities.19  Future refugees were to be included in 
the 1967 Protocol.20  The United States acceded to the Protocol in 
1967, but Congress did not enact its own Refugee Act until 1980.21
Our government codified the Protocol in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) such that an applicant for asylum must be a 
refugee outside one’s country of nationality and must meet the 
following requirements:22 1) the applicant must have a “well-
founded fear of persecution”;23 2) the fear must be based on past 
persecution or the risk of future persecution;24 and 3) the 
persecution must be “on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”25
The treaty and the law were of humanitarian concern, yet, for 
those of us who have worked in the U.S. State Department it has 
always been apparent that the United States adopted them, in part, 
 18. Under the 1951 Convention, the term “refugee” applies to: 
[A]ny person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being  persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1A(2), July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150, reprinted in GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 573 (3d ed. 2007). 
 19.  See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 19, 35. 
 20. Id.; Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Preamble, art. 1, para. 2, 
Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, reprinted in GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 588. 
 21.  See The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)). 
 22. See Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
 23. Id.  An alien will be considered a refugee if she has suffered persecution 
in the past on account of one of the statutory grounds or if she can show an 
objectively reasonable fear of such persecution in the future.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(b)(2) (2008).  See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427–28 
(1987). 
 24. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 25. Id. 
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as tools that could be utilized in the Cold War fight against 
communism.  In the 1980s, the expected profile of the successful 
candidate for asylum under the new law was generally a man who 
may have spoken out against and was forced to flee the stringent 
dictates of a communist or Marxist regime or a country whose 
politics the United States did not approve.26  Much may be the same 
today.  The most successful candidates for political asylum tend to 
be from countries that are communist and/or who have leaders 
and policies of which we do not approve.27
Today, China is one of our greatest trading partners, but the 
leading country of origin for asylees to the United States.28  China is 
still a communist country with coercive population policies.29  As a 
result, in 1996, Congress expanded the definition of asylum to 
provide that forced abortion, involuntary sterilization or resistance 
to coercive population control programs were grounds for 
persecution on account of political opinion.30  The Cold War is 
long over, yet asylum policy is often still used to fulfill our foreign 
policy objectives.31  In the case of China, Congress chose to amend 
 26. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 
GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 20–23 (1993). 
 27. Recent statistics support this thesis.  The total number of persons granted 
asylum in the United States increased to 26,113 in 2006, from 25,160 in 2005.  The 
leading countries of origin of these asylees included China with 21.3 percent, 
Columbia with 11.4 percent, and Venezuela with 5.2 percent.  When Haiti's 11.5 
percent are factored into this calculus, these four countries accounted for nearly 
50 percent of all grants of asylum for 2006.  See KELLY JEFFERYS, DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2006, at 4 
(2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Refugee_ 
Asyleesec508Compliant.pdf. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Thomas L. Hunker, Generational Genocide: Coercive Population Control as 
a Basis for Asylum in the United States, 15 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 131–
32 (2005) (“[a]t the forefront of the controversy stands China’s so-called ‘one 
child’ policy”); see also Kyle R. Rabkin, Comment, The Zero-Child Policy:  How the 
Board of Immigration Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing 
Coercive Family Planning Measures, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 965 (2007). 
 30. See INA § 101(a)(42)(B) which provides, in relevant part: 
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been 
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or 
who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a 
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control 
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of 
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or 
she will be forced to undergo such procedure or subject to persecution 
for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
 31. See generally Hunker, supra note 29, at 141–42 (“[i]n the latter part of the 
6
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asylum law to show our disapproval of its human rights record with 
respect to the use of abortion and other such coercive population 
control measures.32  The increasing grants of asylum to citizens of 
Venezuela based upon their political opinion in opposition to that 
government is an implementation of our foreign policy reaction to 
the political excesses of the Hugo Chavez regime and his anti-
American rantings.33
Since grants of asylum in general are increasing, anecdotal 
evidence indicates that there has been a concomitant increase of 
such grants for persecution on account of sexual orientation or 
gender-based violence.34  The DHS does not disclose a detailed 
record of the reasons for the grants of asylum, but legal advocacy 
groups such as the Whitman-Walker Clinic in Washington, D.C. 
and Immigration Equality in New York City have claimed to have 
secured grants of asylum for numerous LGBT persons in the last 
few years.35
Grants of asylum based on persecution on account of sexual 
orientation began in 1990 when the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA)36 affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ’s)37 decision to 
withhold deportation of a gay Cuban marielito in the case of In re 
20th Century, the push to topple communism resulted in the fall of the Berlin 
Wall . . . in addition, much of U.S. foreign policy reflected opposition to other 
major Marxist regimes . . . anti-communism influences U.S. asylum policies.”). 
 32. See id. at 143 (“[i]t shows that most of Congress viewed section 601 as a 
way to condemn Chinese human rights abuses . . .”). 
 33.  See Tom Brown, Venezuelans, Fleeing Chavez, Seek U.S. Safety Net, REUTERS, 
July 16, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1127066720070716. 
 34.  Interview with Todd Pilcher, Attorney, Whitman-Walker Clinic (Oct. 30, 
2007); Interview with Victoria Neilson, Attorney & Legal Director, Immigration 
Equality (Nov. 15, 2007).  Both attorneys indicate that they have been involved 
with an increase of successful sexual persecution asylum claims over the last few 
years.  Id. 
 35. Id.  These are two of a number of organizations in the United States that 
provide legal representation for LGBT persons and/or women seeking asylum 
because of persecution on account of sexual orientation.  See About Whitman-
Walker Clinic: Our History, http://www.wwc.org/about_wwc/history.html (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2008); IMEQ Mission, http://www.immigrationequality.org/ 
template.php?pageid=8 (last visited Dec. 13, 2008). 
 36. The Board of Immigration Appeals is a component of the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice.  See MARTIN ET AL., 
supra note 10. 
 37. The corps of immigration judges is a component of the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice.  See id. at xi. 
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Toboso-Alfonso.38  This was the first known instance in U.S. 
immigration law where a homosexual was cast as a member of a 
particular social group, namely that of Cuban gays, and permitted 
to allege successfully persecution on that basis so as to conform 
with the statutory definition found in the law.39  The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that homosexuality should 
not be considered a particular social group.40  The BIA rejected this 
argument.41  Four years later, then Attorney General Janet Reno 
issued an order declaring that Toboso-Alfonso was to be considered 
precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.42
It is salient to note that the case involved a male fleeing 
persecution from communist Cuba.  The grant of asylum by the 
BIA and its subsequent precedent setting order by the Attorney 
General may have furthered our foreign policy objectives of 
showing our disapproval of Castro’s human rights position in 
general, and specifically, with respect to his persecution of 
homosexuals.  At the same time, the decision opened an avenue for 
all victims of sexual persecution wherein they could seek asylum in 
the United States.  Whether such consequence was consciously 
desired is debatable. 
The seminal case with respect to women who are victims of 
sexual persecution was decided in 1995 in the case of In re Fauziya 
Kasinga.43  In Kasinga, the BIA reversed an immigration court’s 
denial of asylum for a young Togolese woman who fled her 
homeland to escape female genital mutilation (FGM).44  The BIA 
made very detailed and specific findings, but its most interesting 
findings surrounded the adoption of the following standard: 
“[T]he practice of female genital mutilation, which results in 
 38. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 823 (1990); Robert C. 
Leitner, Note and Comments, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory 
System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 686 (2004).  Fidel 
Armando Toboso said that because he was gay, he was sentenced to sixty days in a 
forced labor camp.  Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 821.  Later, at the time of the 
Mariel boatlift, he was threatened by the Cuban government that if he did not 
leave Cuba immediately he would have to serve four years in prison for being a 
homosexual.  Id. 
 39. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23. 
 40. Id. at 821. 
 41. Id. at 822–23.  
 42.  Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994). 
 43. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1996). 
 44. Id. at 358; see also Irena Lieberman, Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based 
Violence and Asylum Jurisprudence, 29 HUM. RTS. 9, 9–10 (2002). 
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permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life-
threatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of 
persecution.”45  Thus, in very particular and finite cases, women 
fleeing female genital mutilation may be granted asylum in the 
United States based on a reasonable fear of persecution.  The BIA 
immediately designated the decision as precedent to be followed by 
all 179 immigration courts in the country.46
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROBLEMS 
As stated in my earlier article, problems and inconsistencies 
prevail in asylum adjudications for those persecuted on account of 
sexual orientation for a number of reasons, including: A) lack of a 
settled definition for certain statutory words, such as “persecution” 
and “social group”; B) a split in circuit decisions with respect to the 
necessity for a finding of punitive intent in the meaning of 
persecution in asylum cases; and C) the lack of precedent and 
published asylum decisions. 
A. Statutory Terms: Unsettled Definitions 
1. Persecution 
Under both asylum and withholding of deportation, the 
claimant must show that she has been “persecuted” in the past or 
will be “persecuted” in the future if forced to return to the country 
of origin.47  Unfortunately, the statutes do not offer a definition of 
 45. Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 357.  The court also found that 
“[y]oung women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of northern 
Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by 
that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a 
‘particular social group’ within the . . . Immigration and Nationality Act.”  Id. 
 46. Id. at 358 (“A fundamental issue before us is whether the practice of 
female genital mutilation (“FGM”) can be the basis for a grant of asylum under 
section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994) . . . 
[w]e find that FGM can be a basis for asylum.”). 
 47. The applicable standard of proof is higher in a withholding of removal 
than in an asylum grant.  Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 2005).  In 
order to obtain withholding of removal the claimant must show a clear probability 
of persecution.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987).  The showing 
for asylum is only a well-founded fear of persecution.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) 
(2006).  Asylum and withholding of removal appear nearly identical but have 
important differences.  Asylum is subject to the discretion of the Attorney General 
of the United States.  Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A).  Withholding of removal, if proven, is a 
mandatory form of relief.  Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).  
9
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“persecution.”48  The Ninth Circuit has utilized a broad definition 
of persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those 
who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive.”49  The First Circuit 
has held that a brief detention on several occasions did not rise to 
the level of persecution.50  Rather, persecution encompasses threats 
to life or freedom, but it must be more than mere harassment or 
annoyance.51
The Third Circuit limits persecution to “threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they 
constitute a threat to life or freedom.”52  The Ninth Circuit reminds 
us that persecution must be inflicted either by the government or 
by groups that the national government was unwilling or unable to 
control.53  Where the source of the persecution is personal hostility, 
it is considered outside of the realm of persecution for statutory 
purposes and asylum is denied.54  This limitation on persecution is 
particularly disadvantageous to women who are victims of gender 
violence in cultures where conditions for many women are 
“generally harsh,” and their basic rights are likely to be violated.55
The asylum statute must first be amended to provide a 
definition of “persecution” that will provide guidance for those 
seeking relief from persecution. 
Analysis of persecution requires IJs, the BIA, and the courts to 
decide the motive of the persecutor.  The Supreme Court held in 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias that a claimant is not required to provide direct 
proof of the persecutor’s motivations, but a claimant must produce 
A person granted asylum may be eligible for permanent residency in the U.S. after 
one year as an asylee.  8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).  Withholding of removal guarantees 
only that the person will not be forcibly returned to his or her country of origin 
and does not preclude the possibility of being removed to a third country.  Id.       
§ 1231(b).  If  removal proceedings are already underway, the applicant can apply 
for asylum or withholding only by presenting a defensive application that is heard 
exclusively by the IJ.  8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(3) (2008). 
 48. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee,” but 
failing to qualify “persecution”); see also INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). 
 49. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kovac v. INS, 
407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
 50. See Fesseha v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2003).  In this case, the 
woman was only detained, not imprisoned, was held for only twenty-four hours, 
and was never harmed.  Id. at 16. 
 51. See Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 52. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 53. See McMullein v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 54. See Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 805–06 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 55. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. 
10
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some evidence of the persecutor’s motive, whether direct or 
circumstantial.56  Yet, the question remains, does persecution 
require a punitive intent?  Circuit courts have split on this 
question.57  The Ninth Circuit has decided that a broader standard 
than mere intent to punish should be utilized in sexual minority 
cases.58
a. Punitive Intent: The Ninth Circuit 
In 1992, Alla Pitcherskaia, a thirty-five-year-old Russian 
national, claimed asylum in the U.S. on the ground that she was 
persecuted in Russia because she was a lesbian.59  Her claim for 
asylum was denied.60  On appeal to the BIA, her claim was again 
denied on the ground “that even if her testimony is essentially 
credible,” she failed to meet her burden of establishing eligibility 
for relief under the Act.61  The BIA majority found that Pitcherskaia 
had not been persecuted because “although she had been 
subjected to involuntary psychiatric treatments, the militia and 
psychiatric institutions intended to ‘cure’ her, not to punish her, 
and thus their actions did not constitute ‘persecution’ within the 
meaning of the Act.”62
The issue on appeal to the Ninth Circuit was whether the INA 
requires an applicant to prove that the persecutor “harbored a 
subjective intent to harm or punish” when persecuting the victim.63  
The court found the BIA’s interpretation of persecution to be 
arbitrary, capricious, and manifestly contrary to the statute, which 
allowed the court to overrule the BIA’s definition and impose 
another.64  The court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor 
 56. 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992). 
     57. Monica Saxena, More than Mere Semanitcs: The Case for an Expansive 
Definition of Persecution in Sexual Minority Asylum Claims, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
331, 347–49 (2006). 
 58. See id. at 346–47 (2006) (citing Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 59. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643.  In her trial, Pitcherskaia recounted that 
she had been arrested several times for such things as failing to procure required 
permits for a gay-rights protest.  Id. at 644.  She stated that she suffered further 
harassment through forced psychiatric counseling designed to “cure” her 
homosexuality.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 645. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 643. 
 63. Id. at 646. 
 64. See id. at 647. 
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the Ninth Circuit had ever required an asylum applicant to show 
that her persecutor had the intention of inflicting harm or 
punishment.65  The court found that the term “punishment” 
implied that the perpetrator believed the victim did some wrong or 
committed a crime—the perpetrator took action in retribution.66  
Persecution, on the other hand, only required that the persecutor 
caused the victim suffering or harm.67
Although many asylum cases involved situations where the 
persecutor had a subjective intent to punish, the court concluded 
that punitive intent was not required to establish persecution.68  In 
clarifying the new legal standard, the court stated that the 
definition of persecution is objective.69  The court reversed the 
BIA’s order and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration 
in light of the opinion.70
b. Punitive Intent: The Fifth Circuit 
In Pitcherskaia, the Ninth Circuit recognized persecution as the 
infliction of suffering or harm in a way regarded offensive to a 
reasonable person.71  In contrast, the Fifth Circuit finds persecution 
only when the perpetrator acts with intent to punish the victim.72  
In Pitcherskaia, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected this punitive 
intent requirement,73 which the Fifth Circuit adopted in the 1994 
decision of Faddoul v. INS.74
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s denial of Faddoul’s 
asylum claim and held that persecution required both a showing of 
the infliction of harm and intent to punish on one of the five 
 65. Id. at 648. 
 66. Id. at 648. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 647. 
 70. Id. at 648. 
 71. See id. at 647. 
 72. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 73. 118 F.3d at 648 n.9. 
 74. 37 F.3d at 187.  Joseph Faddoul was a thirty-three-year-old man of 
Palestinian ancestry who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia.  Id.  He alleged that 
he was persecuted by the Saudi Arabian practice of jus sanguinis, which grants 
citizenship rights only to residents of Saudi Arabian ancestry.  Id.  He alleged 
further that as a non-citizen living in Saudi Arabia he would be unable to own 
property or businesses or attend the university and, as a result, this constituted 
persecution.  Id. 
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protected grounds set out in the statute.75  In Faddoul, the court 
noted that the claimant received the same rights and was subject to 
the same discrimination as a Saudi-born Egyptian.76  The court 
found no evidence that Faddoul had ever been arrested, detained, 
interrogated, or harmed because of his ancestry.77
This distinction in definitions of persecution is especially 
important to sexual minorities.  In many countries, LGBT persons 
may be abused because of their sexuality, yet, the specific intent to 
punish is not always present, as in Pitcherskaia. 
c. Punitive Intent: The Seventh Circuit 
In Sivaainkaran v. INS,78 the Seventh Circuit adopted a position 
that may lie between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.  The court ruled 
that an asylum claimant could demonstrate persecution by a 
showing of either the persecutor’s motivation to punish or, more 
generally, the infliction of harm for one of the five protected 
grounds of the statute.79  The court’s use of the word “punishment” 
indicates that, unlike earlier holdings, punitive intent is not 
necessary to satisfy the “infliction of harm” requirement.80  The 
Seventh Circuit, following a 1970 case from the Sixth Circuit 
(which has yet to address the question of punitive intent), employs 
a dictionary definition of persecution.81
Nations have human rights laws to protect their citizens, as 
well as the citizens of other nations.82  If nations were allowed to 
 75. Id. at 188. 
 76. Id. at 189. 
 77. Id. at 188–89. 
 78. 972 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 79. Id. at 165 n.2 (“‘Persecution’ is not defined in the Act, but we have 
described it as ‘punishment’ or ‘the infliction of harm’ for political, religious, or 
other reasons that are offensive.”). 
 80. See Saxena, supra note 57, at 349. 
 81. See, e.g., Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Berdo 
v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 846 (6th Cir. 1970)).  
No doubt “persecution” is too strong a word to be satisfied by proof of 
the likelihood of minor disadvantage or trivial inconvenience.  But 
there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended section 243(h) to 
encompass any less than the word “persecution” ordinarily conveys – 
the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, 
religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.  See 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1685 (1965). 
Berdo, 432 F.2d at 846.   
 82.  See Universal Declaration on Human Rights,  G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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torture their own people to “cure” sexual orientation, it is 
impossible to know where they will draw the line.83  The inclusion 
of a punishment requirement in the determination of whether to 
grant asylum based on persecution should not be feasible in all 
circuits.84
Justice requires that the asylum statute be amended to make 
clear that a “punitive intent” need not be required to prove a claim 
for persecution. 
2. Social Group 
To be eligible for asylum, refugees must belong to a particular 
social group if they do not qualify under the other protected 
categories of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.  In 
1994, the Attorney General designated the Toboso-Alfonso case as 
precedent for the proposition that homosexuals who had been 
persecuted in their countries of origin could be recognized as a 
particular social group in all proceedings involving issues of 
persecution involving the same issue or issues.85
Until 2001, there had been two seemingly conflicting 
standards for defining a “particular social group.”  The first was the 
standard derived from the BIA in its 1985 case of In re Acosta.86  The 
BIA held that 
 “persecution on account of membership in a particular 
social group” [meant] persecution that is directed toward 
an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of 
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.  The 
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, 
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might 
be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership.87
Acosta’s claim for asylum on this ground was denied because his 
 83. See generally Saxena, supra note 57. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994). 
 86. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (1985).  In Acosta, the BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of 
asylum to a thirty-six-year-old man from El Salvador who was in deportation 
proceedings.  Id. at 213.  Among his claims for asylum was that he was a member of 
a particular social group: a group of young taxi drivers in the capital city of San 
Salvador in the taxi cooperative known as COTAXI who feared persecution at the 
hands of guerrillas who wanted to disrupt the public transportation system of the 
country.  Id. at 216–17. 
 87. Id. at 233. 
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membership in a taxi cooperative was not an immutable trait.88
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the 
Acosta standard in  Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS.89  The court rejected the 
petitioner’s claim of asylum and held that  
the phrase “particular social group” implies a collection of 
people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated 
by some common impulse or interest.  Of central concern 
is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship 
among the purported members, which imparts some 
common characteristic that is fundamental to their 
identity as a member of that discrete social group.90
The Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS91 reconciled the 
Acosta and the Sanchez-Trujillo definitions of a particular social 
group into one expansive standard, holding “that a ‘particular 
social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, . . . or by an 
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or 
consciences of its members that members either cannot or should 
not be required to change it.”92
 88. Id. at 235. The court indicated that Acosta could leave the cooperative, 
change jobs, and move to another part of the country and would not be a possible 
target of guerilla persecution.  Id. 
 89. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).  Sanchez-Trujillo involved a claimant from El 
Salvador who feared return to his homeland because he believed he might be 
drafted by the government there to fight against the guerillas.  Id. at 1573.  In 
deportation proceedings Sanchez-Trujillo sought asylum on the ground he would 
be persecuted if deported to El Salvador on account of the fact he was a member 
of a “particular social group’ consisting of young, urban, working-class males of 
military age who had never served in the military or otherwise expressed support 
for the government of El Salvador.”  Id. 
 90. Id. at 1576. 
 91. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).  Hernandez-Montiel was a native of Mexico 
who filed for asylum on the ground that he was persecuted in Mexico on account 
of his homosexuality and his female sexual identity, a particular social group.  Id. 
at 1088.  He testified at trial that at the age of eight he realized he was attracted to 
people of his same sex and began dressing and behaving as a woman at the age of 
twelve.  Id. at 1087–88.  He faced numerous reprimands from family and school 
officials because of his sexual orientation, and was also abused and sexually 
assaulted by Mexican police officers.  Id. at 1088.  He subsequently fled to the 
United States where the IJ denied his asylum claim, and the BIA denied his 
subsequent appeal.  Id.  The BIA classified his particular social group as 
“homosexual males who dress as females” and found that he did not sufficiently 
establish that the abuse he suffered in Mexico was a result of his membership in a 
particular social group.  Id.  The basis of his claim “was that he was mistreated 
because of the way he was dressed (as a male prostitute) and not because he was a 
homosexual . . . [he] failed to show that his decision to dress as a female was an 
immutable characteristic.”  Id. at 1090. 
 92. Id. at 1093 (emphasis in original). 
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Hernandez-Montiel defines “particular social group” in a way 
that embraces individuals who are actually persecuted—even if they 
fail to qualify for asylum under the statute’s other enumerated 
categories.93  Such a standard provides a mechanism that meets the 
needs of those who do not fit neatly into a particular racial or 
religious group, but who are still persecuted on account of 
something immutable and fundamental to their persons. 
The Ninth Circuit held that it was not just Hernandez-
Montiel’s dress that was critical for the particular social group 
requirement.94  Instead, it found that his female sexual identity was 
so basic to him that either he could not change it or should not be 
required to change it.95  The implication of such a standard is 
readily apparent in asylum claims based on sexual orientation or 
gender violence. 
The asylum statute should be amended to define “particular 
social group” in a way that embraces individuals who are actually 
persecuted, even if they fail to qualify for asylum under the statute’s 
other enumerated categories.  Thus, it would provide a mechanism 
that meets the needs of those who do not fit neatly into a particular 
racial or religious group but who are still persecuted on account of 
something immutable and fundamental to their persons. 
B. Lack of Precedent and Published Opinions 
The lack of published decisions by United States IJs tends to 
make any analysis of trends within the system problematic.  Both 
the claimant and the government can appeal an IJ’s trial decision 
to the BIA.96  The U.S. Attorney General has the authority to 
designate as precedent or overrule any decision made at the BIA 
level. 97  If unsatisfied with the BIA’s decision, the claimant can then 
appeal to the relevant federal circuit court, whose decision will be 
binding on the BIA in that circuit.98
“The [Executive Office for Immigration Review] is authorized 
to publish its decisions selectively and thereby establish 
 93. Id. at 1099 (“We hold that the BIA’s decision denying Geovanni asylum 
on statutory grounds is fatally flawed as a matter of law . . .”). 
 94. See id. at 1094. 
 95. Id. at 1093–94.  
 96. See  8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1992). 
 97. Stuart Grider, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States – 
In re Tenorio, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 213, 215 (1994). 
 98. Id. 
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precedential value for individual BIA level rulings at its 
discretion.”99  The practical result of this discretion is that few BIA 
decisions are released.100   
One scholar has reported that only about fifty of the four 
thousand decisions made each year by the BIA are actually 
published.  A vast majority of these published cases are 
decisions where asylum is denied, which creates a system 
in which it is nearly impossible for the [claimant], or the 
[IJ], to discern clear standards necessary to establish a 
successful asylum claim.101
This author believes, as do others, that the lack of published 
decisions is deliberate.  Because we have no substantial body of 
published opinions and few precedential decisions, lawyers for 
asylum claimants are seldom able to establish, prior to trial, how 
and why their clients’ asylum claims may be decided.  It is this 
author’s further opinion, based upon experience in immigration 
court, that the few evidentiary and other standards that have been 
established clearly by published precedent or recent administrative 
guidelines are sometimes ignored by IJs.102
IV. GUIDELINES, REGULATIONS, AND “FLOODGATE” PROBLEMS FOR 
WOMEN 
The Kasinga decision, discussed in the introduction of this 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. I recounted a similar situation in my previous article.  Birdsong, supra 
note 9, at 381.  In Ali v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit overturned a decision by an IJ 
denying asylum to a Somali woman who had been raped by militia men of a rival 
clan.  394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005).  The men invaded the woman’s home and 
killed her brother-in-law, who had tried to prevent the rape.  Id. at 783.  The IJ 
found her ineligible for asylum on the ground that she could not establish past 
persecution because "the sole motivation for the murder, detention, and robbery 
. . . ‘was shown to clearly be simply to steal, and in case of the rape to take 
gratification from the helpless condition of the respondent.’"  Id. at 784. 
  The Ninth Circuit found that the IJ was incorrect when it held that the 
rape was for sexual gratification.  Id. at 787.  The court held that “[s]erious 
physical harm consistently has been held to constitute persecution.  Rape and 
other forms of severe sexual violence clearly can fall [into] this rule.”  Id. (quoting 
Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, to 
all INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators (May 26, 1995)).  This 
particular rule was from a 1995 memorandum to all INS and asylum officers 
adjudicating claims from women.  Either the IJ had not read this important set of 
guidelines or ignored them. 
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article, designated FGM as a form of persecution and found that 
young Togolese women who had not undergone such process and 
opposed it could be “a particular social group.”103  Despite that 
decision, as this article will demonstrate, claims by women seeking 
asylum as a result of gender-based violence have not always fared 
well.  A number of such cases of women seeking asylum from 
persecution involved women who had been abused by husbands or 
significant other male figures in their lives who had no connection 
to the government.104  Criticism abounds that granting women 
asylum based upon such perceived “domestic abuse” on the ground 
that they comprise a “particular social group” would open the 
“floodgates” of millions of abused women seeking asylum in the 
United States.105
It is this author’s opinion, again, based upon experience in 
immigration court, that there will not be a flood of abused women 
seeking asylum on domestic abuse grounds.  The main reason is 
the fact that millions of women worldwide who may be so abused 
will unlikely have the resources or wherewithal to make it to the 
U.S. to make such asylum claims.  Further, the Act already provides 
that the filing of frivolous applications of asylum can result in 
permanent ineligibility for any other immigration benefits under 
the Act.106
 103. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1996). 
 104. See Victoria Neilson, Symposium: Globalization, Security & Human Rights: 
Immigration in the Twenty-First Century: Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based 
Asylum Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 417, 434 
(2005) (“This harm, especially at the hand of one’s own family, has not 
traditionally warranted protection by the legal system . . .”). 
 105. See Neilson, supra note 104, at 443: 
Anti-immigrant groups, such as the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform (FAIR), decry asylum as a ‘back door’ means for 
foreign nationals to obtain legal status in the United States without 
establishing the family or employment-based ties of other immigration 
categories.  Not surprisingly, such groups adamantly oppose the 
expansion of asylum categories to include harm based on persecution 
that occurs within the private sphere.  These advocates fear that such 
expansion would lead to a floodgate of asylum seekers in the United 
States.  This fear is simply unfounded. 
See also Ashcroft Re-considers Clinton-Era Asylum Rule, The Dan Stein Report, Mar. 3, 
2003, http://www.steinreport.com/archives/001682.html;  Stephen M. Knight, 
Seeking Asylum From Gender Persecution: Progress Amid Uncertainty, 79 Interpreter 
Releases 689, 695 (May 13, 2002). 
 106. See INA § 208(d)(6) ("If the Attorney General determines that an alien 
has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received 
the notice under paragraph (4)(A), the alien shall be permanently ineligible for 
any benefits under this Act, effective as of the date of a final determination on 
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At least one scholar has advocated that our asylum law should 
be amended to allow for a sixth statutory ground for persecution 
based on gender (along with race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or member of a particular social group).107  This new 
ground would benefit women seeking asylum from persecution 
from non-state sponsored situations such as sexual abuse, rape, 
infanticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, extreme 
domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution. 
Interest in such an amendment has gained little traction, and 
this article does not espouse the need for a sixth ground.  Instead, 
there has been a growing recognition in the international 
community that women should be allowed to seek asylum from 
gender-based violence based on cultural and societal norms of 
certain countries.108  Such recognition first appeared in guidelines 
issued by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
1985.109  A leading scholar in the area, Karen Musalo, recently 
explained it best: 
[B]eginning in 1985, UNHCR began to issue different 
directives or guidance to countries as to how they could 
take that definition [of refugee] and actually not see 
obstacles arising from the definition, but rather, analyze 
how if you apply that definition in a fair way consistent 
with international human rights norms, women would 
actually come within the definition of refugee. 
One of the things that the UNHCR did in a series of 
pronouncements . . . was to suggest that individual 
countries issue their own guidelines to guide their 
adjudicators on how to understand the refugee definition, 
in a gender-sensitive context.110
In 1993, Canada was the first country to issue guidelines for 
adjudicating claims that would protect women fleeing gender-based 
such application."). 
 107. See Elizabeth A. Hueben, Domestic Violence and Asylum Law: The United States 
Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution, 70 UMKC  L. REV. 
453, 466 (2001). 
 108. See id. at 463–64 (“Proposed new rules in the United States dealing with 
asylum claims of women aim to establish guidelines . . . [t]he proposed rules 
restate that ‘gender can form the basis of a particular social group.’”). 
 109. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women (1991), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d4f915e4.pdf. 
 110. Symposium, Panel One—Empowering Survivors with Legal-Status Challenges, 
22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 304, 305 (2007). 
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persecution,111 and the United States followed in 1995 with its own 
guidelines for women.112  It was not long after the United States 
adopted its guidelines that the Kasinga case was decided, in which 
the BIA found that the ground of a particular social group could be 
interpreted to include claims defined by gender.113
Later in 1995 came the gender violence case that continues to 
cause controversy with respect to how we apply asylum law to 
women who are subjected to extreme domestic abuse.  In In re R-A- 
a Guatemalan woman, Rodi Alvarado Pena, sought asylum in the 
United States.114  She fled her country to escape a husband who, for 
at least ten years, had abused her, beaten her, broken a window 
and a mirror with her head, kicked her in her vagina when she was 
pregnant, raped and sodomized her, and had threatened to kill her 
if she ever left him.115  The police would not help her.116  The IJ 
found her testimony credible and granted asylum on the grounds 
that she was a member of “a particular social group,” i.e., 
Guatemalan women who have been involved with Guatemalan male 
companions, who believe that women are to live under male 
domination.117
Despite the earlier Kasinga decision, in 1999 the BIA reversed 
the IJ’s decision and such reversal was affirmed by the Attorney 
General.118  The BIA held that Guatemalan women who have been 
involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions who believe 
that women are to live under male domination is not a particular 
social group.119  Absent from this group’s makeup is a voluntary 
associational relationship that is of central concern in the Ninth 
Circuit.120  In re R-A- has had a tortured history and is a primer for 
 111. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, GUIDELINE 4: WOMEN 
REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (Nov. 13 1996), 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/guidelines/women_e.htm. 
 112. See generally Phyllis Coven, Immigration and Naturalization Service Gender 
Guidelines: Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, 7 
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 700 (1995). 
 113. See Symposium—Empowering Survivors, supra note 110, at 307. 
 114. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (2001). 
 115. Id. at 908. 
 116. Id. at 909. 
 117. Id. at 911.  The IJ found that such a group was cognizable and cohesive, as 
members shared the common and immutable characteristics of gender and the 
experience of having been intimately involved with a male companion who 
practiced male domination through violence.  Id. at 911–17. 
 118. Id. at 906. 
 119. Id. at 919–20. 
 120. Id. at 918.  The court concluded: 
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why abused women have more trouble obtaining asylum under the 
statute than LGBT persons.121
Musalo summarizes the tortured history of the In re R-A- case: 
[I]n 1999 a majority of the BIA—the same body that had 
granted Ms. Kassindja’s case three years earlier—reversed 
the immigration judge’s grant of asylum to Rodi Alvarado.  
The BIA attempted to distinguish the two cases to justify 
the grant in one case and the denial in the other. 
The ongoing ambivalency [sic] on the issue of gender 
asylum became apparent approximately eighteen months 
after the BIA’s decision when the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) issued proposed asylum regulations to address 
claims of gender persecution.  The preamble to the 
regulations explicitly states that their purpose is [to] 
remove “certain barriers that the In re R-A- decision seems 
to pose” to claims for asylum based on domestic violence.  
Within a little more than a month of issuing the proposed 
[T]he respondent has been the victim of tragic and severe abuse.  We 
further find that her husband’s motivation, to the extent it can be 
ascertained, has varied; some abuse occurred because of his warped 
perception of and reaction to her behavior, while some likely arose out of 
psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all . . . .  
We are not persuaded that the abuse occurred because of her 
membership in a particular social group or because of an actual or 
imputed political opinion.  We therefore do not find respondent eligible 
for asylum. 
Id. at 927. 
 121. Cf. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).  Earlier, in 1991, a 
Salvadoran woman had been denied political asylum as not being in a cognizable 
particular social group.  Id. at 662.  Carmen Gomez had been born in El Salvador 
and lived there until she was eighteen.  Id.  Between the ages of twelve and 
fourteen she was raped and beaten by guerilla forces on each of five occasions.  Id.  
After living in the U.S. for almost a decade, she pled guilty to a sale of a controlled 
substance, served time in jail, and was placed in deportation proceedings.  Id.  She 
claimed asylum on the ground of fear of persecution because she was a member of 
a particular social group: women who have been previously battered and raped by 
Salvadoran guerillas.  Id.  The IJ denied her claim of asylum, and the BIA affirmed.  
Id. at 663.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed her petition on the 
ground that Gomez failed to produce evidence that women who have previously 
been abused by the guerillas possess common characteristics—other than gender 
and youth—that would-be persecutors could identify them as members of the 
purported group.  Id. at 664. 
  The BIA further held that there was no indication that Gomez would be 
singled out for further brutalization.  Id. at 665.  The court indicated it did not 
suggest that women who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by 
particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded fear of persecution, but found 
that Gomez had not demonstrated that she was any more likely to be persecuted 
than any other young woman.  Id. 
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regulations, then Attorney General Janet Reno took the 
unusual step of exercising her authority to review the 
decision in In re R-A-.  She vacated the denial of asylum, 
and sent the case back to the BIA, instructing it to 
reconsider the case when the proposed regulations were 
issued as final.122
The aforementioned “proposed regulations,”123 first proposed 
in December 2000, have yet to be finalized because finalization 
became more complicated under the Homeland Security Act, 
which required reorganization of immigration functions.124  They 
were proposed at the end of the Clinton administration, and it is 
now almost the end of the Bush administration.  Bureaucratic 
infighting and opposition by a number of groups with competing 
interests may keep the proposed regulations from ever being 
finalized.  Alvarado’s status still remains in limbo while she awaits a 
final end to her odyssey. 
The main problem with the proposed regulations appears to 
be that they make it more difficult for women like Rodi Alvarado to 
obtain asylum than under the current case law.  Existing case law 
recognizes that once an asylum applicant proves she was 
persecuted, she must demonstrate that such persecution was “on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”125  Thus, she must establish the 
persecutor’s frame of mind.  At present it is only necessary for her 
to establish that at least one of the protected categories was one of 
the motivations, even if it appears that a persecutor had mixed 
motives for inflicting the persecutory harm.126  Under the proposed 
 122. Karen Musalo, The Center for Children, Families, and the Law Interdisciplinary 
Conference: "Welcome to America: Immigration, Families, and the Law": Protecting Victims 
of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call To (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. 
POL'Y & L. 119, 125 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
 123. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 124. Musalo, supra note 122, at 128.  "Whereas prior to the reorganization, the 
regulations were within the sole jurisdiction of the DOJ, they are now within the 
joint jurisdiction of the DOJ and the DHS, which means that both agencies will 
need to reach some consensus on the regulations before they can be finalized.”  
Id.  “In the meantime, the  . . . [DHS], formerly the INS, which had appealed the 
original grant of asylum to Rodi Alvarado and opposed her claim for eight years, 
changed its position, filing a brief in February 2004 in which it argued that she was 
eligible for recognition as a refugee.”  Id. at 126. 
 125. 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A). 
 126. See Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that 
“the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that 
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regulations, she must show that the “protected characteristic is 
central to the persecutor’s motivation” for persecution.127
Although this would be a difficult evidentiary bar to hurdle, 
another commentator reminds us: 
In fact, the proposed rule stresses that applicants may rely 
on circumstantial evidence demonstrating “patterns of 
violence in the society against individuals similarly situated 
to the applicant” in order to establish motive.  The INS 
reasons that this evidence may reflect a country’s societal 
norms and demonstrate the relevant legal system’s 
support for the persecutory conduct.  According to the 
INS, this societal context may help reveal an abuser’s 
belief that he possesses the authority to batter and control 
his victim “on account of” of her inferior position in the 
relationship.128
Notwithstanding the thorny concerns presented by In re R-A-, 
recent cases cited below demonstrate that persecution of LGBT 
persons,129 as well as persecution of women who are victims of 
the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied protected 
ground”) (quoting In re T-M-B-, Interim Dec. No. 3307 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997)).  See 
also Borja, 175 F.3d at 736 (citing Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“persecutory conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one 
motive is one of the statutorily enumerated ground, the requirements have been 
satisfied.”)). 
 127. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76,597–98 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 128. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 207, 224 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
 129. See, e.g., Press Release, Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law 
Clinic Secures Grant of Asylum for Lesbian from Turkmenistan (May 1, 2007), 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2007/may07/sexual
ity_law.   In May 2007 a lesbian from the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan 
was granted asylum.  The woman, whose name is being withheld because of fears 
of reprisal by the Turkmenistan government against family members still in the 
country, had entered the U.S. on a tourist visa and then applied for refugee status.  
Although there is no specific law against lesbians in Turkmenistan, they are 
discriminated against in employment with few ever getting jobs.  In some cases, in 
the mostly Muslim country, lesbians are forced by their families into marriages. 
  See also Shahinaj v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2007) (involving an 
Albanian homosexual who was beaten by police when he reported election fraud 
in an Albanian election); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(wherein an "outed" gay, Shi'ite Muslim man from Lebanon, afflicted with AIDS, 
was able to reverse an IJ's finding that his fear of future persecution was not well-
founded); Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving a 
Mexican homosexual man who was forced to perform oral sex on a high-ranking 
Mexican police officer); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003) (wherein 
the court remanded back to the BIA the case of a Ghanaian man who did not 
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gender violence, has become increasingly accepted as grounds for 
legal asylum in the United States.130  It is often easier for LGBT 
persons to obtain asylum because homosexuals have been certified 
as a “social group” for purposes of asylum and usually not required 
to make a case by case showing of their status.  As In re R-A- 
demonstrates, it is much more difficult for women who are 
persecuted by domestic partners or family members to show that 
they are persecuted “on account” of membership in a definite, 
distinct social group.  The In re R-A- situation can be remedied by 
adoption of my fourth proposed amendment recommendation set 
forth herein. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
In asylum law, guidelines and regulations provide precedent 
for decisions.  Guidelines are prevalent but informal and do not 
carry the force of law.  Regulations are stricter and are normally 
codified in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.131  
Implementing regulations often entails long and arduous policy 
disputes as well as extended time for comment and criticism by 
interested parties and groups.  Indeed, the policy disputes over In 
identify himself as homosexual but feared persecution in Ghana because there was 
evidence that his persecutors imputed to him membership in a "particular social 
group" as a homosexual). 
 130. See, e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving a Somali 
woman whose brother-in-law was shot and killed in her home while she was being 
raped by members of a militia group of a rival clan who opposed Ali's political 
beliefs); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving a claim of 
asylum by a twenty-eight year-old woman from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo where she was raped and imprisoned by soldiers during that country’s civil 
war in 2000.  The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the BIA’s order denying 
asylum and withholding of asylum for providing only a minimal analysis of 
Zubeda’s claims of degrading treatment or punishment under the Convention 
Against Torture); Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (wherein the 
claimant, an Ethiopian woman of Amharic ethnicity petitioned for review of her 
denial of asylum by the BIA.  The Ninth Circuit held that her rape by a 
government official of Tigrean ethnicity, who was her boss, was motivated at least 
in part by the applicant’s Amharic ethnicity, and that she was persecuted on 
account of her nationality and remanded the case to the BIA); Angoucheva v. INS, 
106 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997) (involving a Bulgarian woman who claimed asylum 
based on past persecution on an account that she was sexually assaulted by a state 
security officer, causing her to flee Bulgaria.  The Seventh Circuit vacated and 
remanded her BIA denial of asylum on the ground that she may have been 
persecuted because of her Macedonian nationality). 
 131.  See Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 et seq. (2008). 
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re R-A- have lasted almost a decade.132
It is my suggestion that the proposed regulations be 
abandoned altogether as a failed experiment.  My solution is to 
appeal directly to the U.S. Congress and suggest that it amend and 
clarify the basic Act to reflect much of what the asylum law is 
intended to do.  That is, to provide humanitarian relief to those 
fleeing persecution in their home countries whether it be from 
persecution based on racial, religious, nationality, social group, 
political, or sexual grounds.  The amendments suggested herein 
should make it less burdensome for LGBT persons and women who 
are victims of gender violence to obtain justice in asylum claims.  
Thus, such an amendment will well serve to clarify the law for all 
asylum seekers. 
The Refugee Act has now been a part of the INA for almost 
thirty years.133  Excluding the 1996 amendment recognizing 
coercive population measures as a form of persecution based on 
political opinion,134 little has been done to modernize the statute in 
light of world humanitarian concern regarding persecution of 
sexual minorities.  Aspects of a number of court decisions which 
have interpreted our asylum law should be codified into the INA. 
Despite the problems I have raised in this and my earlier 
article, it is my opinion, after having represented in immigration 
court many persons fleeing persecution, that most immigration 
judges use the best of their abilities to reach a just asylum result.  
The statute, regulations, and guidelines, however, often do not 
provide enough guidance, and in some cases provide conflicting 
guidance. I propose changes to our asylum statute by adding five 
additional subsections to the general asylum provisions found in 
INA § 101(a)(42) that will: 
• Define “persecution” (by synthesizing the holdings of the 
Ninth and Third Circuits) as: The objective infliction of suffering or 
harm which is subjectively experienced upon those who differ, including, but 
not limited to threats to life, confinement, torture and economic restrictions 
so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom; 
• Further provide that there be no required showing of punitive 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 123–27. 
 133.  The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 134.  See Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L.  No. 104-208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)) (expanding the definition of refugee to include those persecuted for 
resistance to coercive population control methods). 
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intent within the meaning of persecution in order to obtain 
asylum.  The approach of the Seventh Circuit should be adopted, 
which  provides: “Persecution” may be demonstrated by either showing the 
persecutor’s motivation to punish or, more generally, the infliction of harm 
on account of the five statutory grounds; 
• Define “particular social group” pursuant to the definition set 
out by the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel as: A group of persons 
united by a voluntary association, or by an innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that the members 
either cannot or should not be required to change it. The group is recognized 
to be a societal faction or is otherwise a recognized segment of the population 
in question; members view themselves as members of the group; and the 
society in which the group exists distinguishes members of the group for 
different treatment or status than is accorded to other members of the society; 
• The statute should recognize, in line with existing 
international and current U.S. guidelines for adjudicating women’s 
claims, that an asylum applicant may assert that she has suffered 
persecution on account of her gender as well as on the other 
statutory grounds: The Attorney General shall consider claims of asylum 
to women whose claims arise from persecution based upon gender-based 
violence that is non-state sponsored such as, but not limited to, sexual 
abuse, rape, infanticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, 
extreme domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution; 
• Provide that the Attorney General: vis-à-vis the BIA, publish 
written opinions of  each asylum case wherein claims of asylum are granted 
on grounds of sexual orientation, gender-based violence and coercive 
population control measures. 
It is my suggestion that these amendments be added to the 
current INA §101(a)(42) as part of the general provisions for terms 
and concepts in the Act. 
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VI. THE MODEL LEGISLATION135
A  Bill 
To amend the Immigration And Nationality Act of 1952, as 
amended, so as to provide clear and definitive definitions 
regarding all refugees fleeing persecution for political and other 
types of humanitarian harms. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and  House of Representative of the 
United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the Immigration 
And Nationality Act, as amended INA § 101(a)(42) (8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)), is amended by adding at the end of Part A the 
following subsections: 
Sec. (42) Definitions: 
For the purposes of this Act the following definitions, 
principles and rules are to be applied: 
(1)  Persecution is the objective infliction of suffering or harm 
which is subjectively experienced or that will be experienced in the 
future upon those who differ including, but not limited to threats 
to life, confinement, torture and economic restrictions so severe 
that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom. 
 135. INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42) currently provides in full: 
(42)The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country 
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no 
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually 
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President 
after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of this title)  
may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's 
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the 
country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is 
persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.  The term "refugee" does not include any person who 
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of 
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.  For purposes of 
determination under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort 
a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been 
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for 
other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be 
deemed to have a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to 
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, 
refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of 
persecution on account of political opinion. 
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(2) Persecution may be demonstrated by showing by direct or 
circumstantial evidence the persecutor’s motivation to either 
punish or, more generally, the infliction of harm on account of the 
statutory grounds set out in Part A of this section. Punitive intent is 
not a necessary requirement for a finding of persecution under this 
Act. 
(3) A particular social group is a group of persons united by a 
voluntary association, or by an innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that 
the members either cannot or should not be required to change it; 
such group may also be recognized as a societal faction or is 
otherwise a recognized segment of the population in question; 
members view themselves as members of the group; and the society 
in which the group exists distinguishes members of the group for 
different treatment or status than is accorded to other members of 
the society. 
The Act will be further amended by adding after Part B of Section 
(42) two new subsections as follows: 
C.  For purposes of determination under this Act, claims that 
arise from persecution based upon gender-based violence that is 
non-state sponsored such as, but not limited to, sexual abuse, rape, 
infanticide, genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, extreme 
domestic violence, honor killings, and forced prostitution shall be 
assessed to determine whether the instance or instances of such 
harm amounts to persecution on the basis of the general principles 
set out herein. 
D.  The Attorney General of the United States through the 
Board of Immigration Appeals shall publish written opinions of 
each asylum case granted wherein such claims are made on grounds 
of sexual orientation and/or gender-based violence in Part A and 
Part C of this section, or are granted on grounds of any coercive 
population program as provided in Part B of this section. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
“The principle of asylum—allowing foreign nationals into 
one’s country because they are persecuted in their homelands—
rests upon an understanding that human beings possess certain 
‘rights’ that all nations must respect.”136  The U.S. Congress has 
 136. John A. Russ, The Gap Between Asylum Ideals and Domestic Reality: Evaluating 
Human Rights Conditions for Gay Americans by the United States’ Own Progressive Asylum 
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made choices with respect to our asylum law.  We have chosen to 
grant asylum to those from foreign countries who can show that 
they have been persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or their status in a particular social group.  Grants 
of asylum on account of such persecution recognize the basic 
human rights that all human beings deserve. 
Asylum and human rights doctrines are intertwined in that 
how a country defines persecution reflects its beliefs about what 
constitutes humans rights violations.137  Persecution of LGBT 
persons, as well as persecution of women who are victims of gender 
violence, has become increasingly accepted as grounds for legal 
asylum in the United States.  For persecuted LGBT persons and 
women subjected to persecution because of their gender, such 
asylum protection represents recognition of their basic rights as 
human beings.138
I urge Congress to implement the recommendations that I 
have set out herein and to amend the INA with respect to asylum.  
Such an amendment will better allow justice to be served in our 
immigration courts with respect to LGBT persons, women victims 
of gender violence who seek asylum from sexual persecution, and 
all others seeking asylum from persecution.  As a humanitarian 
nation, we should not be ashamed to paraphrase the words of 
Emma Lazarus by saying: Give me your gays, your lesbians and your 
victims of gender violence yearning to breathe free of sexual 
persecution; “I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”139
Standards, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L & POL’Y 29, 46 (1998). 
 137. Id. 
 138. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Article 14 recognizes: 
“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.”  See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 564. 
 139. In 1903, the following poem by Emma Lazarus was inscribed at the base 
of the Statue of Liberty: 
"Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me. 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!" 
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